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Summary  
In early 2002 the New England Environmental Finance Center hosted a series of 
roundtable discussions among municipal officials, residential developers, land trust 
representatives, and others about "Innovative Approaches to Land Conservation and 
Smart Growth" [1] . Among our observations was that for many of the over 20 
conservation/development partnerships we discussed in the series, creation and 
maintenance of trust was central to success or failure of various stages of the 
partnership. This suggested a link between creation of trust and financial return for 
traditionally opposed project partners.   
To further examine this matter, we interviewed 11 roundtable participants and asked 
questions about key moments in the course of the project where the main financial 
benefits or losses were realized, and about specific behaviors (by them or others in the 
partnership) that led to creation or dissolution of trust. This report describes 1) the 
roles of developers, land trust representatives, and municipal officials in projects for 
which interviews were conducted; 2) behaviors project partners felt were central to 
creation or dissolution of trust; and 3) particular financial benefits that were obtained 
in these partnerships and that should be attainable in other conservation/development 
partnerships where trust is cultivated.  
Comments on Limited Development  
 "Limited" or "partial" development has been identified as one method of preserving 
open land when outright purchase is not an option for a land trust or municipality. 
Described by one planning professional, it is "financing the preservation of threatened 
property by developing a portion of it." [2] Once a parcel of land has been identified 
as having conservation value (typically by a local land trust, community organization, 
elected official, or municipal professional), these parties work to buy or hold the 
parcel, sell a portion of lesser conservation value to a developer, and sell or assign 
stewardship of the remaining land to a public or nonprofit entity. Limited 
developments are not necessarily "cluster" or higher density projects, although they 
may have conservation easements or contract zoning attached to restrict the type and 
extent of development that will be allowed. Having a third party facilitate the process 
is often critical for time-sensitive negotiations, especially because buying, conserving, 
selling, and stewardship arrangements tend to occur simultaneously and amidst the 
threat of conventional development.   
Also described as "compromise development," limited development balances the need 
to preserve "sensitive" land and accommodate growth [3] ; it thus requires financially 
risky collaboration between parties that have not historically worked together. Though 
road maps for such collaborations are difficult to come by, at least one author has 
offered specific guidelines for land trusts working with landowners to create limited 
development plans [4] . It is the goal of this report to provide additional guidelines for 
those involved in such partnerships, as a context-specific supplement to traditional 
literature on mutual-gains negotiation [5] . 
Role of the Developer  
In the limited development projects studied, developer actions that led to project 
success included readiness to negotiate, outreach to affected parties, maintaining a 
cooperative attitude, and generating support from diverse parts of the community. 
Some developers were additionally willing to accept project constraints and para-
regulatory requirements, and to persevere over extended project timelines. When 
developers pursued non-conservation oriented options while limited development 
options were being discussed, trust was undermined. Examples of developer behavior 
in support of a collaborative partnership included: 
·                     opening one's books to all involved in order to show financial details of 
the project; 
·                     meeting to discuss a project with a known opponent in order to establish 
rapport and defuse antagonism; 
·                     taking a property off the market to allow time for grants and funding 
sources to be arranged in support of a limited development option; 
·                     incorporating feedback from project abutters; 
·                     bringing a large-scale development proposal (for example for a "big 
box" retailer), allowed under ordinance, to the table in order to spark 
conversation and compromise, and challenge negative attitudes toward a 
limited development project; and 
·                     hiring a third-party mediator to help with negotiations.  
Role of the Conservationist/Land Trust  
The land trust typically sees itself in the role of keeper of the community's vision for 
conservation. In the case of expensive land, some conservationists found it in their 
best interest to partner with a developer to conserve sizeable portions of a parcel, 
rather than do nothing or attempt to purchase the land outright on the open market. 
The most successful role in these cases was described by behaviors that 
accommodated development within the overall framework of conservation goals for 
the community. Behaviors that fostered these partnerships included: 
·                     identifying critical parcels of land; 
·                     presenting (to a municipality or developer) limited development options 
compatible with land conservation; 
·                     establishing compromise positions; and 
·                     bringing together wide coalitions in support of particular projects.   
Extreme tactics (such as derision in the press) and not involving relevant stakeholders 
undermined several otherwise effective conservation-oriented project proposals. 
Because acquiring funds, changing zoning ordinances, and working with project 
complexities tended to protract project timetables, being patient was also a most 
constructive behavior. Other helpful behaviors included:  
·                     proactively presenting a developer with a conservation-oriented option 
for a valuable parcel of land; 
·                     identifying the balance between the conservation agenda and the 
development strategy in the acquisition of a key parcel; 
·                     asking the developer for an outright donation of the land, to get the topic 
of conservation on the table. 
·                     spearheading the public relations campaign for a limited development 
project by inviting the press to see the property and using regular news releases 
to keep the project in the public eye; 
·                     aggressively advocating for a limited development project with the local 
planning board and legislative body in order to overcome trust issues within the 
community. 
·                     aggressively recruiting participation from other conservation groups in 
order to secure political support and grant money at the earliest possible point; 
·                     engaging in persistent outreach and communication in order to keep a 
project on track (e.g., following up meetings with calls, writing letters, and 
meeting face to face); and  
Role of the Municipality  
Many municipalities have struggled to incorporate conservation goals into 
comprehensive planning and zoning regulations, because public pressure to preserve 
land occasionally conflicts with long-term economic interests of the community. To 
balance fiscal and environmental needs, several municipal officials interviewed met 
with representatives from various interests to establish guidelines for a negotiated 
proposal development process. They subsequently crafted ordinances and zoning 
variances that created developer incentives for the preservation of open space. The 
most supportive role for the municipality was thus defined by mediative behaviors and 
setting the stage for effective negotiation. Extreme tactics, such as the threat of 
eminent domain or using the zoning variance process to extract concessions from 
developers and land trusts, were seen to erode partnership opportunities. When a 
municipality created excessive guidelines for project implementation, some limited 
development projects became uneconomical and could not proceed. 
Examples of constructive, process-oriented behavior included:  
·                     Evaluating the relative merits of competing proposals (typical vs. 
limited development) for the same parcel side by side, in order to dramatize 
public benefit. 
·                     Taking the role of lead educator in promoting the benefits of 
conservation-oriented development. 
·                     Negotiating a compromise between a developer's proposal for narrower 
roads and the public works/public safety departments' desire for standard road 
width, by assessing the developer a fee equal to his cost savings for use in 
creating a town park or other public amenity. 
·                     Brokering the design of a conservation easement and hunting 
restrictions in exchange for limited development on remaining portions of 
parcel. 
·                     Openly supporting projects with a strong open space component in order 
to defuse political pressure and secure funding.  
Trust and Risk  
For conservation/development partnerships to be effective, each partner must perceive 
clear benefits of their involvement. Each partner has a threshold for considering a 
project to be a "good deal;" developers and landowners seek maximum financial 
outcomes; land trusts seek the greatest amount of valued land in permanent protection 
(and, at the same time, cannot afford doing projects for free); and municipalities seek 
efficiency of land use and scarce financial resources. The key to successful partnering 
lies in achieving individual thresholds in tandem with other participants. Ensuring this 
result requires trust among project partners. 
Although trust is not easy to quantify, it is manifest in a variety of tangible benefits 
that serve as adequate proxies. For the land trust, mutual confidence may result in its 
acquiring a parcel that might otherwise be unobtainable; being involved in a process 
that might otherwise be closed; and increasing membership in its service area. 
Collateral benefits of trust also impact the municipality, which can see a less divisive 
public process of deliberation, and higher levels of engagement in planning and public 
policymaking. For the developer, following the path of least resistance (seeking 
approval of projects that simply meet requirements of traditional ordinances) may 
appear to be optimal, but may not be so in situations where collaboration with 
conservation interests can increase density on developed portions of a parcel. 
However, developers increasingly perceive the approval process to be unpredictable, 
and have a sense that many current planning and development standards have hidden 
costs. One impact of this can be initial mistrust between developers and the 
municipality. To counter this, several developers noted that being involved in 
partnerships with strong conservation elements can improve a developer's image in 
the community and enhance future business opportunities. They also suggested that 
the mutual confidence resulting from collaboration with conservation groups can 
dramatically increase likelihood of success for any given project. 
Risks inherent to such partnerships are considerable, however. If a partnership fails to 
result in adequate profits or protected land, participants may feel their investments 
were wasted. Each potential partner has a threshold for risk; each must weigh 
thepotential consequences of trying to collaborate and failing versus continuing with 
the status quo. Importantly, though, individuals are not without means to influence the 
magnitude of tolerable risk in a collaborative effort. Several veterans of successful 
conservation/development partnerships mentioned they felt it was necessary to change 
their own behavior in order to change the system or the pattern within which they 
were operating. Indeed, our interviews suggest that in a majority of cases, benefits of 
cultivating conservation/development partnerships will outweigh risks, provided the 
individuals entering the partnerships are willing to change their own behavior, rather 
than looking for changes among other parties. 
Financial Return  
In any limited development project, there is a given amount of potential money to be 
generated; the difference in projects involving collaborative partnerships is the size of 
that "pot" and its distribution [6] . For example, in one limited development project 
we examined in Rhode Island, developers and the land trust were able to find common 
interest in the land. As a result, the land trust was able to preserve 142 acres of a 174-
acre parcel at a cost of $1.2 M. The developers paid $1.6 M for the remaining 32 
acres. Together they defined the conservation goals and established criteria for the 
new development. In return, the developer obtained both financial benefit from the 
proximity of his project to a conservation area and political benefit from improving 
his image and working relationship with the municipality. The land trust preserved the 
bulk of the parcel, including the most geologically significant areas. 
In a conventional development, the land owner and developer are typically the only 
parties who make money. The municipality may see a negative fiscal impact through 
the increase in infrastructure costs associated with low-density developments, without 
a commensurate increase in property tax revenues.  The land trust may consider the 
loss of land to conventional development an opportunity cost to the community. In 
contrast, in a collaborative partnership on a conservation/development project, the 
expectation is that funds to be generated will increase and benefits will accrue to all 
parties. When this occurs it can be referred to as the "realization of latent financial 
interests" which, we argue, is a trust-based result. 
In the partnerships we examined, several specific financial benefits were obtained 
through trusting the collaborative process. It is our view that these results will be 
attainable in other conservation-development partnerships where trust is cultivated. 
By role, these benefits are as follows: 
Developer  
·                     Permitting processes may be shorter (and associated expenses fewer) 
when it is in a land trust's interest to see the project approved. In more than one 
instance that we observed, the trust successfully approached the municipality to 
speak on behalf of a project. 
·                     Being conservation-minded and cooperative may lead to better 
reputation and increase in business. 
·                     Changing the development scheme from a parcel purchased and 
developed with standard zoning to a parcel with a conservation easement and 
higher density may result in a higher profit margin. 
·                     Defusing opposition and antagonism may lead to fewer lawsuits, which 
may reduce overhead.  
Conservationist/Land Trust  
·                     Reducing outlays for purchases of complete parcels may reduce costs. 
·                     Reputation and influence of land trust may be improved in the 
community, leading to an increase in dues-paying members and donors to the 
land trust (which may even include developers). 
·                     Cost of human resources may be lower in situations where major 
conflicts over a development do not emerge. Land trusts will be more able to 
focus on long-term goals than having to put out brush fires. 
·                     Collaboration with other conservationist interests may lead to an 
increase in grant funding. 
Municipality  
·                    Use of infrastructure will be more efficient. 
·                     Property tax revenues will more adequately cover service expenses in 
cluster developments. 
·                     Costs of human resources may be lower in situations where extended 
conflict over a project is avoided. Planners and elected officials will be able to 
focus on long-term public interests instead of fighting developments in 
potential conservation areas. 
·                     The community as a whole may take a greater interest in public 
participation in planning, meaning that developments may better reflect 
financial and other needs of the citizenry. 
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RI Aquidneck Island Land Trust Conservationist 
  
Nan Cumming Portland, ME Portland Trails Conservationist 
  












Bob Linck Craftsbury, VT Vermont Land Trust Conservationist 
  




Shep Spear Georgetown, MA Camelot Realty Trust Developer 
  
Harvey Perry Westerly, RI Westerly Land Trust Conservationist 
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